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IRVINE V. RECLAMATION DrsT.

No. 108

[24 C.2d

based on and payable out of the assessment or assessme.Llts
upon which the bonds so refunded were payable, in accordance
with the provisions of section three thousand four hundred
eighty of this. code." [9] One of the purposes of the statute authorizing the issuance of refunding bonds was to provide for the payment of post maturity interest on the old bonds
by a regular and systematic scheme which may well be advantageous to the governmental agency. Implicit in that purpose is the thought that interest continues after maturity
where no refunding bonds are issued. Moreover, inasmuch
as the interest on the refunding bonds is in effect post maturity interest on the old bonds, and the same assessments
stand as security, the reasonable implication is that such assessment in the first instance was intended to and did contemplate post maturity interest.
Defendant complains that there is no source from which
funds can be derived for the payment of post maturity interest, thus evincing a legislative intent that it is not payable.
We have heretofore seen that the assessments do contemplate
such interest and there are indications in the statute that such
is the case. Also it will be remembered that the statute provides for supplemental assessments when "any part of the
principal or interest of said bonds ... shall remain unpaid
after enforcement of the assessments." [10] Even if we
assume that the supplemental assessment may not be made
until all the bonds mature, and all steps for the enforcement of
the assessment have been taken, and only when the supplemental assessment will not exceed the value of the benefits to the
landowners from the project (see Rohwer v. Gibson, supra),
that does not preclude the running of interest after maturity.
Although the interest may run for a long time before the
supplemental assessment is made, it cannot be said that economic chaos for the district will follow. It has its relief by
way of refunding bond issues which have proven effective
to relieve such districts of financial pressure.
There are affirmative indications that the original assessment is the source for the payment of post maturity interest
as well as the principal and ante maturity interest. Although
not conclusive and possibly subject to other interpretations,
taken with the act as a whole, they certainly tend to show
that there is no prohibition in the statute against the payment
of such interest. We are not in a position to work out the
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minute details of the amounts that may be realized from those
sources or precisely to what extent they extend to such interest, but we are concerned rather with the legislative intent.
The statute provides that the lien of any unpaid assessment
shall continue until the bonds shall have been paid in full.
The unpaid assessments bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent
per annum from the date the bonds are issued until the bonds
are "fully paid and discharged." The maximum rate of interest on the bonds is 6 per cent. When the treasurer makes
a call he shall add 15 per cent of the amount estimated to be
required to cover possible delinquencies. A penalty of 10
per cent is added for delinquency in payment of assessments,
and both a redemptioner and a purchaser after the redemption
period must pay interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum.
Various other penalties are imposed and all of the fundS
thereby realized are payable into the bond fund.
On the whole we think that the legislative intent is clear
that post maturity interest is recoverable on the bonds involved in the instant actions, but is not recoverable on the
interest coupons attached thereto.
For the foregoing reasons the judgments are and each of
them is, reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition fora rehearing was denied August 7,
1944.

[So F. No. 16885. In Bank. July 10, 1944.]

HELEN F. BENNETT, Appellant, v. GEORGINA E. FORREST, as Executrix etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction Over Matters of Administra-

tion-Scope and Extent.-Ancillary to and as an incident of
the probate court's jurisdiction in distribution proceedings, it
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 27; [2] Willii,
§ 156; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 33; [4, 6] Decedents' Estates,
§ 1053; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1179; [7] Trusts, § 131; [8]
Trusts, § 303(1).

J

486

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

BENNETT V. FORREST

[24 C.2d

has the power to determine the effect of a property settlement
agreement on a husband's will and the persons to whom the
pr(jperty of the estate is to be distributed.
Wills-Agreements as to Wills-Effect of Contract on Probate.
-An agreement to make a will can have no effect on the will
or the right to legacies thereunder inasmuch as it involves the
making of a will after its execution. Where, however, an
agreement follows a will previously executed, the issue is not
whether there has been a breach of the agreement, but what
effect, if any, the agreement would have in respect to a revocation of the will or a legacy under Prob. Code, § 73, or a relinquishment of any legacy or devise made in the will.
Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction Over Matters of Administration-Title of Estate.-A sister of the deceased who claims
that she is entitled to the whole estate as the sole heir at law,
and that the widow forfeited her right to inherit by virtue of
a property settlement agreement relinquishing her right as an
heir, is not asserting a title or interest adverse to the estate,
as such agreement does not affect the circumstance that her
claim must be derived from her status as an heir, but is pertinent only as a factor in determining whether she is an heir
who is entitled to inherit, which involves such questions as the
degree of kinship, the presence or absence of prior heirs, or
the existence of property which may pass by intestate succession.
Id.-Decree of Distribution-Conclusiveness.-In an action by
decedent's sister to impress a trust on properties held by a
widow as legatee, involving the issue of the effect of a property settlement agreement on the widow's right to take under
the will, a finding in the distribution decree in probate proceedings that the spouses had effected. a reconciliation and
that their agreement was not in effect at the time of decedent's
death, was res judicata of that issue and operated as a bar to
the cause of action. The probate court having jurisdiction
to determine said issue, its conclusion, right or wrong, was
binding.
Appeal-Presumptions-Findings Outside Issues.-In an action to establish a trust, upon appeal from a judgment for
defendants on the judgment roll alone, where findings had
been made that the issue involved was determined in probate
proceedings, it will be assumed that any objection to defects
or insufficiency in pleading the defense of res judicata was
waived impliedly or by stipulation.

[2] See 26 Cal.Jur. 834.
[3] See IlA Cal.Jur. 94-96.
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[6] Decedents' Estates-Decree of Distribution-Conclusiveness.In an action to establish a trust, the trial court's finding that
it did not find that a finding in the distribution decree in probate proceedings was res judicata did not eliminate the probate decree as being res judicata where all the factors necessary to make the decree of distribution available as a bar
were found, as the ultimate conclusion of whether said decree
was res judicata was one of law rather than of fact.
[7] Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Wrongful Acquisition of Property.-A constructive trust where one unlawfully comes into
possession of property of a decedent is one imposed by law.
[8] Id.-Actions to Establish-Pleading Constructive TrustFraud.-In an action by decedent's sister to impress a trust
on properties held by the widow as legatee, wherein it was
alleged that the widow's claim under the will was in violation
of a property settlement agreement and "constitutes a fraud
upon plaintiff," the fraud at most was constructive, no specific
acts of fraud having been alleged.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Frank T. Deasy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action to establish a trust and for injunctive relief.
ment for defendants affirmed.

Judg-

Fletcher A. Cutler, Duncan A. McLeod and Clarence M.
Oddie for Appellant.
Marcel E. Ced, Robinson & Leland for Respondent.
CARTER, J.,-Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant Georgina E. Forrest individually and as executrix
of the last will of Francis G. Forrest, her deceased husband,
to impress a trust on properties received from his estate by
defendant, as legatee.
In 1937, defendant commenced an action against her husband for separate maintenance. Finally, after various proceedings were taken in that action, and on February 28, 1938,
the parties entered into a property settlement agreement adjusting all of their property rights. The complaint in the
separate maintenance action was amended to state a caUSe of
action for divorce. Defendant was granted an interlocutory
decree of divorce in March, 1938. No fiual decree was ever
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entered. Defendant's husband died about 14 months after
the interlocutory decree was granted.
The will of Mr. Forrest dated .August 6, 1921, together with
a. codicil dated August 14, 1933, was admitted to probate, and
defendant, being named therein as such, was appointed executrix. The will left all of decedent's property, with the exception of one legacy, to defendant. Plaintiff is a sister, and
an heir at law of deceased, and she seeks by this action to have
it determined that by the property settlement agreement defendant forfeited all right to inherit from the deceased, or
take under his will, and that the will was revoked as to defendant, leaving plaintiff as sole heir of deceased.
The property settlement agreement, after disposing of the
property provides: "Each party shall have the right to dispose of his or her property, by last will and testament, or
otherwise, and each party agrees that all the estate of the
other party shall, subject to the within agreement and to his
or her debts and engagements, go and belong to the person,
or persons, who would have become entitled thereto if the
parties had never been married; and it is further convenanted
and agreed that each party will permit any will of the other
to be probated, and will allow administration upon his or
her estate to be taken out by the persons or person who would
have been entitled thereto, if the parties had never been married ....
"This agreement is intended to be, and is, a full, complete,
entire and final settlement of all property rights between the
parties and all rights, duties and obligations arising out of
the marital relation now existing, and such rights, duties and
obligations as might hereafter accrue but for this agreement;
and each of the parties hereto does mutually agree to and
does by these presents forever release and discharge the other
party from all obligations, either in law, or in equity, arising
out of the marital relation, or otherwise, for support, maintenance, alimony, court costs or counsel fees, and shall thenceforth entertain no claim upon the other, either conjugal, or
otherwise, except as set forth in this agreement. Each party
hereto further agrees to, and by these presents does waive,
relinquish, quitclaim and release all right, title, claim or demand of every nature in and to any property, either real,
personal (1J' mixed, to be held or owned at any time in the
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future by the other party hereto, whether acquired by purchase, gift, bequest, descent, devise, or in any other manner,
and wheresoever such property may be situate. And the parties hereto, and each of them, do hereby expressly waive, relinquish and surrender any and all claims and rights to inherit
or claim dower in, or family allowance or homestead from, or
otherwise secure an interest in, any property whatsoever by,
through or from the other party hereto, which claim and right
said parties, and each of them, respectively do hereby relinquish and surrender in favor of all of the heirs, legatees,
devisees and assigns of such party so dying, and to the exclusion of either and each of said first and second parties
hereto, respectively, including the right to administer upon
the estate of the other party."
It is alleged in the complaint that decedent's will was admitted to probate and defendant duly qualified as executrix
thereof. Defendant, in her answer, denies the legal effect
given to the property settlement agreement in the complaint
and alleges in paragraph II of her first answer, "that heretofore in the probate proceedings (in decedent's estate) . . .
in proceedings wherein plaintiff herein and defendants herein
were parties and were on opposite sides, an order was duly
made and entered in said proceedings wherein it was adjudicated that plaintiff was not the sole heir at law of said Francis
G. Forrest, deceased; that plaintiff herein appealed from said
order, and said order was affirmed on appeal, and remittitur
filed in said proceedings." And in paragraph III of her first
answer, that defendant "claims to be entitled to distribution
of a portion of the property of said estate pursuant to the
terms of said will referred to in said complaint; that Georgina
E. Forrest, as such executrix, has filed in said probate proceedings a petition for distribution of said estate to Georgina
E. Forrest, individually, and to Jane B. Forrest, pursuant to
the terms of said will; that plaintiff herein has filed objections to said petition and has petitioned for distribution of
said estate to herself; that said petition and the objections
thereto have been heard and submitted to the court for decision, and decision thereon is now pending; that said objections seek distribution of said estate to plaintiff upon the
same grounds asserted in the complaint herein. " In her second separate answer she alleges "that the issues, if any, pre-
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sen ted by the complaint have been determined in said probate
proceedings. " The court found that all of the foregoing
allegations in defendant's answer are true, except in reference
to the allegation in paragraph III of the first answer in which
it found "that in said probate proceedings a decree of distribution was heretofore made and entered directing distribution of said estate as prayed in the petition for distribution
therein, that no appeal was taken therefrom, and that said
decree has become final." Upon plaintiff's motion for a new
trial the court amended its finding that the allegations as to
the second answer were true by stating that the decree of
distribution contained a finding "that prior to the death of
said Francis G. Forrest, and after the execution of said agreement, said decedent and Georgina E. Forrest effected and
consnmmated a reconciliation and resumed marital relations;
that said agreement dated February 28th, 1938, including the
provisions thereof set forth in the opposition of Helen F.
Bennett to petition for final discharge, was not in force or
effect at the time of the death of said decedent;
"That said decree of distribution was made and entered
in said probate proceedings on December 18, 1941, and that
no appeal has been taken from said decree of distribution,
and that the time for appeal therefrom has expired.
"This court does not find that this finding is res adjudicata."
The allegation in paragraph II of the first answer of defendant, quoted above, referring to an order in the probate
proceedings as having been affirmed on appeal, apparently
refers to the order appointing defendant as executrix of the
estate over the objection of plaintiff who there asserted that
by the property settlement agreement defendant had waived
her right to serve as executrix. (See Estate of Forrest, 43
Cal.App.2d 347 [110 P.2d 1023].) There the court affirmed
the order of appointment, but stated that no issue was involved in regard to the right to take as a legatee under the
. will. (Estate of Forrest, S1tpra, 350.)
The findings of the trial court above-mentioned present the
question of whether the decree of distribution was res judicata
in the probate proceedings on the cause of action stated by
plaintiff. The issues presented were whether or not decedent's will was revoked as to defendant by the property settle-

./

ment agreement, who was entitled to take under the will, and
the matters incidental thereto such as the validity and effect
of the agreement.
[1] Ancilliary to and as an incident of the probate court's
jurisdiction it had power to determine, as it did, the effect
of the agreement on the will and to whom the property of
the estate was to be distributed. It has been held generally
that "Under various circumstances the probate court may
determine the validity and effect of contracts when ancilliary
to a proper judgment by it." (Dobbins v. Title Guarantee
&; Trust 00., 22 Cal.2d 64, 68 [136 P.2d 572].) It has been
held particularly, that in a proceeding to remove a wife as
administratrix of the husband's estate, on the ground that she
has ceased to be an heir by virtue of Ii marriage settlement
agreement, the probate court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the validity and effect of the agreement (Estate of Oover,
188 Cal. 133 [204 P. 583] ; See Estate of Warner, 6 Cal.App.
361 [92 P. 191] ; Estate of Dobbins, 36 Cal.App.2d 536 [97
P.2d 1051] ; Estate of ~McNutt, 36 Cal.App.2d 542 [98 P.2d
253]) ; that in passing upon a petition by a widow for family
allowance from her deceased husband's estate the validity
and effect of a property settlement agreement may be determined (Estate of Yoell, 164 Cal. 540 [129 P. 999] ; Estate of
Hamalian, 57 Cal.App. 169 [206 P. 1011]) ; that the validity
and effect of a property settlement agreement could be considered in a will contest on the issue of sufficiency of the husband's interest to contest the will (Estate of Edelman, 148
Cal. 233 [82 P. 962, 113 Am.St.Rep. 231]) ; that an agreement
did or did not constitute a renunciation of heirship in proceedings to determine heirship, and· the validity thereof
(Estate of McOlelland, 181 Cal. 227 [183 P. 798]) ; and that
a probate court in distribution proceedings may pass upon
the question of whether or not one claiming to be an heir held
such status by reason of an agreement between the deceased
and another in which the former agreed to adopt the claimant .
(Johnson v. Superior 00urt,102 Cal.App. 178 [283 P. 331].)
It is of some significance, although the particular point was
not disaussed, that in the followirig cases the issue of the effect
of a property settlement agreement upon the right to take by
will or succession was adjudicated by the probate court.
(Estate 0/ Orane, 6 Ca1.2d 218 [57 P.2d 476, 104 A.L.R.

492

BENNETT 'V. FORREST

[24 C.2d

July 1944]

BENNETT

v.

FORREST

493

[24 C.2d 4851

!I

I

I,

I

1101] j Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 41 [255 P.800] j Estate
of Walker, 169 Cal. 400 [146 P. 868] j Estate of Martin, 166
Cal. 399 [137 P. 2] j Estate of Winslow, 121 Cal. 92 [53 P.
362] j In re Davis, 106 Cal. 453 [39 P. 756] j Estate of Minier,
215 Cal. 31 [8 P.2d 123, 81 A.L.R. 689] j Estate of Johnson,
31 Cal.App.2d 251 [87 P.2d 900] j but see Weinstein v. Moers,
207 Cal. 534 [279 P. 444].) In the distribution proceedings
in the instant case the issue to be determined was: Who were
entitled to take as beneficiaries of the estate Y As an incident
to that determination the effect of the property settlement
agreement could be determined; that is, whether it be viewed
as constituting a renunciation by the defendant of the legacy
under the will or a revocation of such legacy pursuant to section 73 of the Probate Code.
Plaintiff cites and relies upon caselS holding first, that a
probate court may not determine the effect or validity of an
ag"L'eement to make a will or devise property to a designated
person in the probate proceeding following the death of one
of the contracting parties (see 26 Cal.Jur. 834, § 163), and
second, that a probate court has no jurisdiction to determine
claims or titles adverse to the estate (Wi'kerson v. Seib, 20
Cal.2d 556 [127 P.2d 904] j see llA Cal.Jur. 94-96).
[2] The first proposition is based upon the ambulatory
character of a will and that a will cannot be made irrevocable.
Such an agreement can have no effect upon the will or the
right to legacies thereunder inasmuch as it involve,' the making
of a will after its execution. A different situation is presented when we have an agreement following a will previously
executed. Then the issue is not whether there has been a
breach of the agreement. It becomes a question of what
effect, if any, the agreement would have in respect to a revocation of the will or a legacy under section 73 of the Probate
Code or a relinquishment of any legacy or devise made in
the will. Certainly a determination of whether a will or a
legacy or devise thereunder has been revoked or relinquished
is for the probate court inasmuch as the direct problem presented is' the effectiveness of the will and who may take thereunder. The effect of a contract bearing upon that subject
is an incidental matter that may be determined. To epitomize what we have said, the agreement in the instant case is
manifestly not one to make a will, and the issue here presented is the effect of an agreement on a will already made.

./

[3] The second rule above-mentioned is not applicable
because the claim of plaintiff is not the assertion of a title
or interest adverse to the estate in the sense that phrase is
used. She is an heir of the deceased by reason of her kinship and she must rest her claim on that basis. True, the
agreement provides as appears from the above-quoted excerpt
therefrom that defendant relinquishes her right as an heir
in favor of the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent,
but that relinquishment takes nothing away from the estate.
If it does anything it restores the property to the estate, the
only issue being who are the heirs and qualified to take from
the estate either by will or intestate succession. The relinquishment amounts to nothing more than leaving the decedent free to dispose of his property as he pleases whether that
be by an act during life or by operation of law on death
under the rules of intestate succession. Basically, plaintiff's
claim must be derived from her status as an heir. The agreement does not affect that circumstance. It comes into the
picture only as a factor in determining whether she is an heir
who is entitled to inherit, which involves such questions as
the degree of kinship, the presence or absence of prior heirs,
or the existence of property which may pass by intestate succession depending upon the presence or absence of a will under which others may take. Hence, we cannot agree with
plaintiff's assertion that she is claiming the title to the property under the property settlement agreement and thus adverse to the estate.
[4] Plaintiff contends that the defense of res judicata was
not pleaded and that the finding was against it. With respect
to the pleading it is apparent from the heretofore quoted
excerpts from defendant's answer that at the time it was filed
the petition for the decree of distribution was pending in the
probate court and defendant so asserted in her pleadings.
She could do no more as the decree had not been rendered.
Technically, the proper procedure would ha:ve been for her to
file an amended or supplemental pleading after the decree of
distribution was made. However, it is apparent from the
findings that the issue was fully litigated. It is found that
the identical issues raised in the trial in the instant case were
determined in the probate proceedings, that is, the effect of
the property settlement agreement on defendant's right to
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take under the will. All the customary elements such as identity of subject matter, parties and the like were adjudicated.
It is true that the findings mention a reconciliation as being
a determinative factor nullifying the effect of the agreement,
but we are not concerned with the validity or invalidity of
the rules of law applied. The probate court having jurisdiction, its conclusion, right or wrong, is binding. [5] The
appeal being taken upon the judgment roll alone, and findings having been made which lead to only one conclusion,
namely, that the issue was determined in the probate proceedings, it will be assumed on appeal that any objection to defects or insufficiency in pleading the defense was waived impliedly or by stipulation. (See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti,
9 Cal.2d 95 [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342] ; Gin S. Ohow v.
Oity of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673 [22 P.2d 5] ; Bonnelfillio
v. Ricks, 214 Cal. 287 [4 P.2d 929] ; Newland v. Hatch, 59
Cal.App.2d 13 [137 P.2d 884].)
[6] Defendant asserts that the trial court's finding that:
"This court does not find that this finding is res judicata"
(that sentence appears in the foregoing quoted excerpt from
the findings) eliminates the probate decree as being res judicata because the trial court must find on that issue. As we
have seen all of the factors necessary to make the decree of
distribution available as a bar were found. The ultimate conclusion of whether it was res jUdicata was one of law rather
than fact. The statement is peculiarly worded and might
imply that the court does not find on the law issue one way
or the other. But assuming it is a negative finding it is
nothing more than a legal conclusion from the facts found,
a matter upon which this court is at liberty to draw the correct conclusion to support the judgment. There is nothing
in Reidy v. Superior Ootwt, 220 Cal. 111 [29 P.2d 780], contrary to those views. There this court merely refused to prohibit proceedings in an action in which the defense of res
judicata was raised because such a plea did not oust the trial
court of jurisdiction. Nor are the cases of Baird v. Superior
Oourt, 2'04 Cal. 408 [268 P. 640], Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 12
Ca1.2d 633 [86 P.2d 826], and United Security Bank & Trust
00. v. Superior Oourt, 205 Cal. 167 [270 P. 184], contrary.
Those cases merely adhere to the proposition that a claim of
res judicata does not oust a court of jurisdiction and that once

/

the trial court 11M made its final adjudication that a former
judg'lI1cnt is not a har in the instant action, that determination
is final and conclusive whether right or wrong. They do not
involve the question of whether a judgment may be affirmed
ou appeal on the ground that a former judgment is res judicata when in the light of the facts found the question of the
legal effect of the former judgment is merely a legal conclusion and the trial court's contrary eon elusion on that issue.
The foregoing conclusions are not altered by the plaintiff's
assertion that she claims that defendant holds the property
for her as an involuntary trustee. [7] A constructive trust
where one unlawfully comes into possession of property of
a decedent is one imposed by law. The essential question is
whether it came to them unlawfully. That issue as we have
seen was determined adversely to plaintiff in the probate proceeding and is res judicata. [8] Plaintiff alleged that defendant's claim under the will is in violation of the property
settlem.ent agreement and "cop..stitutes a fraud upon plaintiff." At most the fraud would be constructive (see Weinstein v. Moers, supra) ; no specific acts of fraud are alleged
and the court found those allegations untrue. There are no
pleadings or findings even approaching a showing of extrinsic
fraud in obtaining the decree of distribution.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment but for reasons
other than in the majority opinion.
The majority opinion rejects plaintiff's contention that
decedent revoked the legacy to his widow by executing the
property settlement agreement, on the ground that the decree
of distribution operates as a bar to this cause of action, that
"ancillary to and incident of the probate court's jurisdiction
it had power to determine, as it did, the effect of the agreement on the will and to whom the property of the estate was
to be distributed." In concluding that the probate court decided the issue concerning the revocation of the legacy as an
incident of the distribution of the estate, the majority opinion
relies upon the finding in the distribution decree that the
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spouses had effected a reconciliation and that their agreement
was not in effect at the time of decedent's death. It is my
opinion that this finding has no bearing on the issue of revocation. If decedent revoked the legacy by executing the
agreement, the subsequent suspension of the agreement by
reconciliation would not revive the legacy. (In re Lones, 108
Cal. 688 [41 P. 771] ; see, Ferrier, Revival of a Revoked Will,
28 Cal.L.Rev. 265, 266.) The finding in question simply indicates that the agreement did not prevent defendant from
asserting rights to her husband's estate as a legatee under his
will. The question whether the agreement had become inoperative before decedent's death was within the jurisdiction
of the probate court, for that court may refuse to distribute
any part of the estate to a l~gatee claiming under a valid will,
if the legatee by a previous agreement or otherwise is estopped
to assert his rights under the will. (Estate of Crane, 6 Ca1.2d
218 [57 P.2d 476, 104 A.L.R. 1101].) The probate court,
however, has no jurisdiction, in a proceeding directed to the
distribution of the estate, to determine whether the will was
revoked. Since this question concerns the validity of the will
submitted to probate, it can be litigated and decided only in a
will contest. (Estate of Parsons, 196 Cal. 294 [237 P. 7441.)
If no contest is initiated within the period allowed in sections
380 and 384 of the Probate Code, the order admitting the will
to probate is conclusive under section 384 as to the validity of
the will. (Estate of Parsons, supra; Estate of Baker, 170 Cal.
578, 585 [150 P. 989] ; Estate of Duraind, 51 Cal.App.2d 206,
213 [124 P.2d 330].) Plaintiff did not institute a will contest
within the six-month period allowed by section 380, and is
therefore bound as to the issue of revocation by the finality
of the order admitting the will to probate.
The question remains whether plaintiff in seeking to impress
a trust on the property received by defendant from the estate
can rely on the theory that she seeks specific performance of
the property settlement agreement as a third party beneficiary. It iB settled that a contract of a person to dispose of
his property by will in a particular manner can be given
effect as against the will, not by the probate court but by a
court of equity, and that the remedy to impress a trust on
the property received by the legatee is in the nature of specific
performance of the contract. (Estate of Rolls, 193 Cal. 594
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[226 P. 608]; Wolf v. Donahue, 206 Cal. 213, 220 [273 P.
5471; Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal.2d 469, 473 [45 P.2d 198].)
This remedy applies also to a contract between testator and
legatee in which the legatee renounces the right to take under
the will. (Weinstein v. Moers, 207 Cal. 534 [279 P. 444].)
Since the remedy is in the nature of specific performance, it
does not depend, as suggested in the majority opinion, upon
extrinsic fraud. For another reason, however, plaintiff cannot have a trust impressed upon the property. She cannot
have such relief without showing that the executory provisions
of the agreement were in effect at the time of decedent's death.
She is precluded from so doing by the probate court's finding
that as a result of a reconciliation of the spouses, the agreement was not in effect at the time of decedent's death. This
finding, though made upon another cause of action, is conclusive upon plaintiff as to this previously litigated issue,
since a decision rendered between the same parties on the
same issue estops either party from relitigating the issue even
in another court or on a different cause of action. (English
v. English, 9 Ca1.2d 358 [70 P.2d 625, 128 A.L.R. 467] ; Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2'd 195,201 [99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497] ;
Johnson v. Fontana County F.P. Dist., 15 Ca1.2d 380,389 [101
P.2d 1092] ; see Restatement, Judgments, § 68.)
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[1] Interpleader-Common Law Requirements.-The common law

bill of interpleader had four essential elements: (1) The same
thing, debt or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties
against whom the relief is demanded; (2) all of the adverse
titles or claims must be dependent, or be derived from a com[1] See 30 Am.Jur. 218.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 9, 11-15] Interpleader, § 3; [5, 16,
17] Interpleader, § 8(2); [6,7] Interpleader, § 4; [8] Landlord and
Tenant, § 74; [10J Interpleader, § 1; [18J Pleading, § 103.

